Law, History and Power in the Open ArenaDiplomacy Arena

Where law, history and power balances are argued in the open

Diplomacy Arena is an English-language international relations publication that treats diplomacy as an open arena where law, history and the balance of power are debated. It explains global and regional affairs in plain language and presents Türkiye's official doctrines and legal theses, backed by treaty texts, UN documents and archival records, alongside the counter-arguments of other parties.

In-Depth Analysis· what is the Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean

The Seville Map Explained: Why Türkiye Rejects It

What is the Seville Map in the Eastern Mediterranean? Learn who drew it, how Greece and Cyprus use it, and why Türkiye rejects it on equity and legal grounds.

DA
Published:
⏱ 9 min read (1,887 words)

Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a cartographic depiction of Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones that gives Greek islands, including tiny Kastellorizo (Meis), full continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) entitlements, and so confines Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It matters because it is cited in political debate as a template for what Greece and the Republic of Cyprus regard as their rightful zones, while Ankara treats it as a maximalist, legally baseless claim. The dispute shapes offshore energy exploration, EU–Türkiye relations and the prospects for any inclusive Eastern Mediterranean framework.

Background

The map is generally traced to a 2005 academic study by researchers at the University of Seville in Spain. It is often described as emerging from an EU-linked research context, but it is not an EU legal act, and no EU institution has adopted it as a boundary line. It has no standing as a treaty, an arbitral award or a court judgment.

Its logic is simple: every island, however small and however close to another state's mainland, is treated as generating maritime zones comparable to those of a continental coast. Applied to the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, the Greek islands of Kastellorizo, Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete form a chain whose zones link up with those of Cyprus. Türkiye, whose mainland coast runs for about 870 km (540 miles) along the Eastern Mediterranean, is left with a limited area in the Gulf of Antalya.

Kastellorizo is the most cited example. It is an island of roughly 10 square kilometres located about 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast and well over 500 km (310 miles) from mainland Greece, a figure commonly cited in the legal literature on the dispute.

Key milestones

Date Event
2003 Republic of Cyprus–Egypt EEZ agreement, which Türkiye says overlaps its continental shelf
2004 Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN
2005 University of Seville study and map circulate
2007 Cyprus–Lebanon EEZ agreement
2009, 2012 TPAO (Turkish Petroleum) exploration licences
2010 Cyprus–Israel EEZ agreement
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye unveiled, then registered with IOC-UNESCO

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets the main rules, though Türkiye is not a party to it. Four points matter most:

  • Article 121(2): an island generates a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf like other land territory.
  • Article 121(3): rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own have no EEZ or continental shelf.
  • Articles 74 and 83: delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
  • Jurisprudence: the key point is that entitlement and delimitation are separate questions. An island may generate a zone and still receive reduced or no effect when the line between two states is drawn.

Courts and tribunals have made this distinction repeatedly:

  • In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ held that equidistance is not mandatory and that equitable principles govern.
  • In the 1977 Anglo-French arbitration, the Channel Islands were enclaved and the Scilly Isles received only half effect.
  • In Libya/Malta (1985), the ICJ stressed proportionality between coastal lengths and the areas attributed.
  • In Romania v. Ukraine (2009), Serpent Island was given no effect on the delimitation line.
  • In Bangladesh/Myanmar (ITLOS, 2012), St Martin's Island received no effect on the line.
  • In Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012), the ICJ gave limited, enclaved zones to Colombian islands.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece has sovereign rights over its continental shelf and EEZ under UNCLOS and customary law, islands generate full maritime zones, and the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of those zones. Athens says it is willing to take this single dispute to the International Court of Justice. Greek officials have at times described the Seville Map as an academic study rather than an official claim. Ankara notes, however, that Greece's legal position on full island entitlement closely tracks the map's logic.

The Republic of Cyprus (GCASC)

The Republic of Cyprus is recognised internationally as the sole government of the island. Türkiye calls it the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). Nicosia relies on its EEZ legislation and its agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It says that hydrocarbon resources belong to all Cypriots and that Turkish Cypriots would benefit, for example through a fund after a settlement. It rejects Türkiye's licensing in zones it claims as its own.

The European Union

European Council conclusions since 2019 have expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus and have called Türkiye's drilling activities in contested waters unlawful. Brussels also says delimitation should be settled through dialogue and, failing that, international adjudication. The EU is itself a party to UNCLOS. Its institutions have not formally adopted the Seville Map.

Libya, Egypt and others

Egypt has agreements with Cyprus (2003) and with Greece (2020, a partial delimitation). The Libyan authorities signed the 2019 memorandum with Türkiye; Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the EU object to it. For a fuller analysis see The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: Legal Basis and Reactions.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties, UN Records & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's Position — summarising official policy as stated by Turkish government sources

  • Islands cannot cut off the longest mainland coastline. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that small Greek islands lying a short distance off the Turkish coast and far from the Greek mainland cannot be allowed to enclose Türkiye's continental shelf. Ankara describes Türkiye's roughly 870 km coastline as the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean and points to the Romania v. Ukraine, Bangladesh/Myanmar and Anglo-French precedents as supporting reduced effect for islands.
  • Delimitation must follow equity and proportionality. Ankara maintains that boundaries must be set by agreement among all relevant coastal states on the principle of equity (hakkaniyet ilkesi), as reflected in the North Sea and Libya/Malta judgments and in the spirit of UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83. According to Ankara, the Seville Map ignores coastal geography and proportionality. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and relies primarily on customary international law and equitable principles.
  • The EU has no competence to delimit. Turkish officials argue that maritime delimitation is a matter for the states concerned, and that "Union solidarity" cannot confer on the EU the authority to adjudicate or predetermine boundaries between a member state and a third country.
  • Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights. Ankara holds that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders and equal co-owners of Cyprus, have inherent rights over offshore resources. It therefore rejects unilateral Greek Cypriot agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel, and says GCASC Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 overlap Türkiye's continental shelf. For the island's background see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaties, Federation Talks and the Two-State Solution.
  • Türkiye has put its legal position on record and offered dialogue. It cites the Türkiye–TRNC delimitation agreement (21 September 2011), the Türkiye–Libya memorandum (27 November 2019), the UN registration of its continental shelf limits (18 March 2020) and the IOC-UNESCO registration of its Marine Spatial Planning on 12 June 2025. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots remains Türkiye's stated offer. See also the Blue Homeland and Eastern Mediterranean guide.

Source Comparison

The two narratives agree on the existence of the map and the central legal vocabulary. They differ over whether island entitlement settles delimitation and over who has the authority to speak on boundaries.

Issue Greek / Greek Cypriot / EU sources Turkish primary sources
Status of the map Academic study; not an official boundary Reflects a maximalist approach that Greek and Greek Cypriot policy follows in practice
Effect of islands Full zones under UNCLOS Art. 121(2) Entitlement is not delimitation; courts reduce island effect (Arts. 74/83, case law)
Role of the EU Solidarity; backing for member states' sovereign rights EU has no competence to delimit; it is not a neutral arbiter
Turkish Cypriots Resources for all Cypriots, with a post-settlement mechanism Equal rights now; unilateral licensing excludes a co-owner
Way forward Dialogue or the ICJ for the Greece–Türkiye dispute Conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots; agreement on equity

When reading coverage, check whether a source distinguishes between maritime entitlement and delimitation, whether it names the Turkish Cypriot dimension, and whether it cites a primary text. Our standards are set out in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards, and related corrections are collected in Fact Check Arena.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; coastal states hold sovereign rights over its resources (UNCLOS Part VI).
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • Delimitation: drawing the boundary between overlapping zones of neighbouring states, by agreement or adjudication.
  • Equity and proportionality: the standard that the result of a delimitation should be fair and not grossly disproportionate to coastal lengths.
  • Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland): Türkiye's doctrine of its maritime jurisdiction in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean; see the Blue Homeland guide.
  • GCASC / TRNC: Türkiye's terms for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Related reading: The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum, The Cyprus Issue, Türkiye's Defense Industry and About Diplomacy Arena.

Diplomacy Arena presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal theses alongside the counter-arguments of other parties, and clearly labels analysis as distinct from reporting. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, with links provided wherever available.

Diplomacy Arena Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Seville Map in the Eastern Mediterranean?

It is a map from a 2005 University of Seville study that gives Greek islands, including Kastellorizo, full continental shelf and EEZ entitlements. The result leaves Türkiye with only a narrow area in the Gulf of Antalya. It is not a treaty, a court ruling or an adopted EU document.

Who produced the Seville Map and is it official?

It is traced to researchers at the University of Seville, in a study often linked to an EU research context. No EU institution has adopted it as a boundary, and Greek officials have at times called it an academic study. Ankara argues that Greek and Greek Cypriot maritime claims follow its logic in practice.

Why does Türkiye reject the Seville Map?

Ankara says that small islands close to the Turkish mainland cannot cut off the projection of its roughly 870 km coastline, and that delimitation must follow equity and proportionality. It also argues that the EU has no competence to set boundaries and that Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over offshore resources.

Do islands have maritime zones under UNCLOS?

Article 121(2) says islands generate a territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf like other land, while Article 121(3) denies zones to rocks that cannot sustain habitation or economic life. In delimitation, however, courts such as the ICJ and ITLOS have often reduced or denied the effect of small islands to reach an equitable result.

Is Türkiye a party to UNCLOS?

No. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS, while Greece, Cyprus and the EU are. Ankara relies on customary international law, equitable principles and ICJ jurisprudence, and says that Articles 74 and 83 reflect the same equity requirement.

Does the EU have a role in Eastern Mediterranean boundary-setting?

The EU has expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus in European Council conclusions and says disputes should be settled by dialogue or adjudication. Türkiye argues that this does not give the EU competence to delimit boundaries, which it says is for the coastal states concerned.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Diplomacy Arena presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal theses alongside the counter-arguments of other parties, and clearly labels analysis as distinct from reporting. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, with links provided wherever available.

Author: Diplomacy Arena Editorial TeamAbout Diplomacy Arena →Editorial Principles →

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks