In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye defense industry domestic production rate

Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production

How Türkiye's defense industry reached an official ~80% domestic production rate: UAVs, KAAN, MİLGEM, missiles, NATO context, exports and critiques.

By Diplomacy Arena Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 10 min read (2,059 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

Turkish officials say roughly 80% of the country's defense needs are now met domestically, up from about 20% in the early 2000s; the figure is an official claim and definitions of 'domestic' are not standardized.
The modern drive for self-reliance traces to the US arms embargo of 1975–1978 after the 1974 Cyprus operation, and was reinforced by the 2019 F-35 removal and 2020 CAATSA sanctions.
Flagship programs include Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı and Kızılelma unmanned systems, the KAAN fighter, Hürjet, TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM warships and SOM, ATMACA and HİSAR-O missiles.
Engines, certain sensors and some electronics have been the most import-dependent areas, so headline 'domestic' percentages do not mean every component is Turkish-made.
Export growth has triggered debate over arms-control standards, UN embargo allegations in Libya and the use of armed drones, while Ankara argues its exports are lawful and its policy responsible.

Why It Matters

Turkish officials, including the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), say that about 80% of Türkiye's defense requirements are now met by domestic industry, compared with roughly 20% in the early 2000s. If accurate, this is one of the fastest shifts from importer to producer among major military powers. It matters because it changes Türkiye's leverage inside NATO, its relations with arms suppliers and its role as an exporter of armed drones, ships and missiles.

The figure should be read as an official claim, not an audited statistic. There is no universally agreed method for measuring 'domestic production rate', and independent verification is limited. This article therefore separates what is documented (programs, dates, first flights, commissioning, sanctions) from what is asserted (percentages).

Background

From dependence to embargo

Türkiye joined NATO in 1952 and for decades equipped its forces largely through allied supply, grants and licensed production. The turning point came after the 20 July 1974 Cyprus operation, when the US Congress imposed an arms embargo that ran from 1975 to 1978. Ankara has consistently cited that episode as the origin of its self-reliance policy (see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaties, Federation Talks and the Two-State Solution).

Institution-building timeline

Year	Milestone
1973	Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ/TAI) founded
1975	ASELSAN (electronics) founded by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation
1985	Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (SSM) established
1988	ROKETSAN (missiles) founded
2011	First MİLGEM corvette, TCG Heybeliada, commissioned
2018	SSM reorganized as the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), reporting to the Presidency
2019	Delivery of Russian S-400 systems; Türkiye removed from the F-35 program
2020	US CAATSA sanctions imposed on SSB
2020–2022	Bayraktar TB2 used in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, drawing global attention
2022	First flight of the Bayraktar Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft
2023	TCG Anadolu commissioned; Hürjet first flight
2024	First flight of the KAAN fifth-generation fighter prototype; 'Steel Dome' integrated air defense concept announced

What 'domestic' does and does not mean

Many Turkish systems combine national design with imported subsystems or licensed foundations. Examples include:

T129 ATAK: developed with Italy's AgustaWestland (now Leonardo) on the A129 Mangusta platform, with a US-UK LHTEC engine.
Fırtına howitzer: began as a licensed derivative of South Korea's K9 Thunder.
TCG Anadolu: built at Sedef Shipyard on a design derived from Spain's Juan Carlos I-class vessel.
Bayraktar TB2: relied on a Rotax engine from Austria, and Canada restricted export of electro-optical sensors in 2020 after the Karabakh war. Turkish firms have since prioritized national engines and sensors.

Engines, advanced sensors and some microelectronics remain the weakest links. KAAN prototypes initially use US-made F110 engines, while a national engine, the TF-35000, is under development.

The Systems at a Glance

Domain	Main systems	Main developers
Unmanned aircraft	Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, Kızılelma (Baykar); Aksungur, ANKA (TUSAŞ); Kargu loitering munition (STM)	Baykar, TUSAŞ, STM
Manned aircraft	KAAN fighter, Hürjet jet trainer/light combat aircraft, T129 ATAK helicopter, Hürkuş	TUSAŞ
Land	Fırtına howitzer, Kirpi and Vuran armored vehicles, MEMATT unmanned demining vehicle, MPT-76 rifle	MKE, Otokar, BMC, ASELSAN and others
Naval	TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship, MİLGEM corvettes and frigates, offshore patrol vessels, Reis-class submarines	Turkish shipyards, STM, ASELSAN
Missiles and air defense	SOM cruise missile, ATMACA anti-ship missile, Cirit, OMTAS, UMTAS, HİSAR-O, SİPER	ROKETSAN, TÜBİTAK SAGE, ASELSAN
Electronic warfare and radar	KORAL and other national radar and EW systems	ASELSAN

Unmanned systems: the visible breakthrough

The Bayraktar TB2 was used in the conflicts in Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (2020) and Ukraine (2022), where it became a global reference for relatively low-cost armed drones. The larger Akıncı, TUSAŞ's Aksungur and ANKA, and the jet-powered Kızılelma (first flight 14 December 2022) form a ladder of capabilities from tactical to high-altitude and combat-aircraft class.

Aircraft and the KAAN program

The KAAN, formerly TF-X, flew its first prototype on 21 February 2024. Türkiye pursued a national fighter partly because it lost its place in the F-35 program in 2019, after buying the S-400. The Hürjet, which first flew in 2023, is meant to replace aging trainers and provide a light combat variant.

Naval and missile programs

The MİLGEM (National Ship) program produced the Ada-class corvettes, the Istif-class frigates and patrol vessels. Ada-class designs have gone to Pakistan and Ukraine. The ATMACA anti-ship missile has been exported to Indonesia, and SOM is an air-launched stand-off cruise missile. HİSAR-O is a medium-range air-defense system, and Ankara's Steel Dome project aims to link sensors, shooters and command systems into a layered network.

Key Players & Positions

Türkiye's industrial base

The SSB coordinates procurement and export licensing. State-linked firms such as ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, TUSAŞ and MKE work alongside private companies such as Baykar, Otokar, BMC and STM. Official statements credit this mix with speeding development, though some analysts note that state demand and financing remain central to the sector's economics.

The United States

Washington says the S-400 purchase is incompatible with the F-35 and with NATO interoperability. It removed Türkiye from the F-35 program in 2019 and imposed CAATSA sanctions on the SSB in December 2020. US export licensing for components such as engines has reportedly affected some Turkish export deals, for example helicopter sales to third countries.

European states and NATO

In October 2019, following Operation Peace Spring, several European governments and Canada restricted arms exports to Türkiye. In the Madrid trilateral memorandum of 28 June 2022, Finland and Sweden agreed to lift their arms-export restrictions on Türkiye as part of their NATO accession process. NATO officials, in general, welcome Türkiye's industrial capacity and its role in Black Sea security, while European officials debate duplication versus complementarity with allied programs.

Critics and arms-control advocates

UN panels of experts on Libya have alleged violations of the UN arms embargo involving several states, including Türkiye. Human rights organizations and some UN experts have also raised concerns about civilian harm from armed drones in various conflicts and about the proliferation of loitering munitions. A 2021 UN Libya panel report on the Kargu-2 fueled debate about autonomy in weapons; the interpretation of that report has itself been contested.

Buyers and partners

Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ukraine, Qatar and a growing list of countries in Africa, Asia and Europe have bought or co-produced Turkish systems. They typically cite price, availability, fewer political conditions than some Western suppliers, and willingness to transfer technology.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Treaties, UN Records & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's argument is that defense self-reliance is a matter of strategic autonomy, grounded in historical experience and international law. The following points reflect official Turkish positions as stated by Turkish authorities.

Autonomy as a lesson of embargoes. According to statements by the Presidency and the SSB, the 1975–1978 embargo, later export restrictions and the 2019–2020 F-35 and CAATSA decisions demonstrated that foreign dependence can be politically conditioned. Ankara argues that national production protects the continuity of its forces.
Counter-terrorism and self-defense. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense ground cross-border operations against PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and DAESH in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union. Ankara says armed drones and precision munitions allow it to limit civilian harm; see Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Article 51, Northern Syria and Terror-Free Türkiye.
Contribution to the Alliance. Türkiye points to its NATO membership since 1952, its large armed forces and its control of the Straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention, arguing that a stronger Turkish industry strengthens collective deterrence. See Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation.
Lawful, responsible exports. Türkiye is a participating state in the Wassenaar Arrangement, and its exports are licensed through a state process. Ankara says its exports go to governments for legitimate self-defense and that its Libya cooperation was conducted at the request of the internationally recognized government under the 27 November 2019 agreements; see The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: Legal Basis and Reactions. It rejects what it sees as politically selective embargoes.
Blue Homeland security. Turkish officials link modern naval platforms to protecting maritime rights in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean; see Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: A Guide to Maritime Jurisdiction.

The 'about 80%' figure itself is an official claim, repeated by the Presidency and the SSB. Readers should treat it as Ankara's own metric, not an independently audited one.

Source Comparison

Question	Turkish official sources	Western and international sources
Domestic rate	About 80% in recent years, versus roughly 20% in the early 2000s	Acknowledge rapid growth; note that engines, sensors and electronics still involve imports and that the metric is not standardized
Origin of the push	Embargoes and unreliable supply, starting with 1975	Agree on embargo history; also cite state-led industrial policy and the post-2016 political climate
S-400 and F-35	Response to air-defense needs when allied offers were not available; Ankara has proposed a technical working group	US says S-400 threatens F-35 security and NATO interoperability; CAATSA sanctions remain a point of friction
Exports	Lawful, licensed, mainly to governments for self-defense	Welcome diversification of suppliers but raise concerns over embargo violations, human rights and end-use monitoring
Drones in conflict	Precision reduces collateral damage; operations lawful under Article 51	NGOs and UN experts document civilian harm in several theaters and call for stronger controls
Strategic effect	Strengthens NATO and regional deterrence	Debate over whether it makes Türkiye a more autonomous, less predictable ally

For how this site handles such comparisons, see Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards and the Fact Check Arena.

What to Watch

Whether the KAAN's national engine and mission systems mature on schedule.
Whether Western licensing for engines, sensors and optics eases or tightens.
Progress of Steel Dome and layered air defense.
Export reviews by buyers and suppliers, and any new UN or EU scrutiny.
Independent assessments, including SIPRI data, of Türkiye's shift from importer to exporter.

SSB (Presidency of Defense Industries): the Turkish body coordinating defense procurement, R&D and export licensing, reporting to the Presidency since 2018.
SİHA / UCAV: armed unmanned aerial vehicle, in Turkish silahlı insansız hava aracı.
MİLGEM: Milli Gemi, the national warship program.
CAATSA: the US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, used in 2020 against the SSB.
Wassenaar Arrangement: a multilateral regime on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods.
Strategic autonomy: the capacity to act without being constrained by another state's supply decisions.
Loitering munition: a weapon that circulates over an area before striking a target.

Diplomacy Arena Editorial Team.

Diplomacy Arena presents Türkiye's official perspective and legal theses alongside the counter-arguments of other parties, and clearly labels analysis as distinct from reporting. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaty texts, UN documents, official statements and archival records, with links provided wherever available.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Regional Order: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How It Reached About 80% Domestic Production — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production: Bayraktar drones, KAAN, MİLGEM, Hisar-O, export controls and critics' concerns.
Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How Domestic Production Reached About 80% and What It Means — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production: Bayraktar TB2, KAAN, TCG Anadolu, air defense, embargo debates and strategic autonomy.
World Agenda Review: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: From Bayraktar TB2 to KAAN — How Türkiye's defense industry reached about 80% domestic production, from Bayraktar TB2 drones to the KAAN fighter, and what it means for NATO and autonomy.

Frequently asked questions

What is Türkiye's defense industry domestic production rate?

Turkish officials, including the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), say about 80% of defense needs are now met domestically, up from roughly 20% in the early 2000s. This is an official figure with no standard international methodology, and engines, some sensors and electronics have remained more import-dependent.

Why did Türkiye build its own defense industry?

Ankara cites the US arms embargo of 1975–1978 after the 1974 Cyprus operation, later export restrictions and the 2019 removal from the F-35 program as proof that foreign supply can be politically conditioned. Its answer was long-term investment in firms such as ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, TUSAŞ and Baykar.

What are Türkiye's best-known defense systems?

The best known are the Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı and Kızılelma unmanned systems, the KAAN fighter, Hürjet trainer, T129 ATAK helicopter, Fırtına howitzer, TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM warships, and the SOM, ATMACA and HİSAR-O missile systems. Some, such as the T129 and Fırtına, began as licensed or co-developed designs.

Is Türkiye's defense industry fully independent of foreign suppliers?

No. Many systems use imported engines, sensors or components, and some designs originated with foreign partners. Türkiye is working on national engines such as the TF-35000 for the KAAN, but full independence across all components has not been reached.

Why are Turkish arms exports controversial?

Critics point to UN panel allegations about embargo violations in Libya, concerns over civilian harm from armed drones, and the spread of loitering munitions. Ankara replies that its exports are licensed and lawful, that its Libya cooperation followed a request from the recognized government, and that its operations are conducted under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

How does the defense industry relate to NATO?

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952 and has one of the alliance's largest militaries. Turkish officials argue that national production strengthens collective deterrence, while the S-400 purchase and CAATSA sanctions remain a source of friction with Washington.

Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research

Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications

4 Partner Desks